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Requirements of ultra-low power for many portable devices have drawn increased attention to digital 
sub-threshold logic design. Major reductions in power consumption and frequency of operation 
degradation due to the exponential decrease of the drain current in the sub-threshold region has made 
this logic an excellent choice, particularly for ultra-low power applications where performance is not 
the primary concern. Examples include RFID, wireless sensor networks and biomedical implantable 
devices. Along with energy consumption, security is another compelling requirement for these 
applications. Power analysis attacks, such as Correlation Power Analysis (CPA), are a powerful type 
of side channel attacks that are capable of performing a non-invasive attack with minimum 
equipment. As such, they present a serious threat to devices with secret information inside. This 
research analyzes sub-threshold logics from a previously unexplored perspective, side channel 
information leakage. 
Various transistor level and RTL circuits are implemented in the sub-threshold region as well as in 
the strong inversion region (normally the standard region of operation) using a 65 nm process. 
Measures, such as Difference of Mean Energies (DME), Normalized Energy Deviation (NED) and 
Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) are employed to evaluate the implemented architectures. A 
CPA attack is also performed on more complex designs and the obtained correlation coefficients are 
used to compare sub-threshold and strong inversion logics.  
This research demonstrates that sub-threshold does not only increase the security against side 
channel attacks, but can also decrease the amount of leaked information. This research also shows 
that a circuit operating at sub-threshold consumes considerably less energy than the same circuit 
operating in strong inversion and the level of its instantaneous power consumption is significantly 
lower. Therefore, the noise power required to cover the secret information decreases and the attack 
may be dramatically more difficult due to major increase in the number of required power traces and 
run time. Thus, this research is important for identifying sub-threshold as a future viable technology 
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1.1 Objectives and Motivations 
In the mid 1990’s, power consumption limitations, especially for portable devices commenced a new 
era in sub-threshold circuit design. Specifically, all the transistors in a sub-threshold circuit operate in 
sub-threshold region. Applying a power supply voltage less than the threshold voltage of the MOS 
transistor ensures this functionality. The drain current of an MOS transistors illustrate an exponential 
dependence on the gate voltage in the sub-threshold region in contrast to the linear/quadratic 
dependency in the standard region of operation, also known as strong inversion.  
This exponential decrease of drain current with the gate voltage causes a major reduction in power 
consumption; however, it also degrades the frequency of operation. Therefore, sub-threshold logics 
are an excellent choice for ultra-low power applications where performance is not the primary 
concern. Despite the research efforts into sub-threshold circuits, sub-threshold chips have not yet been 
commercially available [1]. Some recent commercial chips utilize near-threshold circuitry [2] but sub-
threshold design and chips remain in academic and industrial labs. Some examples of research 
applications of sub-threshold include RFID[3], wireless sensor networks, biomedical implantable 
devices[4], and others [5][6][7]. Clearly security is an important aspect in these applications, yet 
limited research has been done in this area. 
Side channel analysis attacks utilizing the power measurement of circuits were published in 1999 
[8].  These attacks exploit the secret information of cryptographic devices by observing physical 
characteristics of the device, such as power consumption [8], electromagnetic radiation [9] and run 
time [10]. Power analysis attacks such as differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power 
analysis (CPA) are an important type of side channel analysis attack. Instantaneous power 
consumption of a cryptographic device is recorded during its operation and subsequent analysis may 
reveal the secret information by exploiting the dependency of power consumption on the handled data 
within the device. In general the attacker does not need to know detailed information about the 
implementation of the cryptographic device in order to launch the attack. Hence, their capability to 
perform a non-invasive attack with minimum equipment and implementation knowledge has made 
them a serious threat for cryptographic devices. 
Security is a compelling requirement for most applications in which sub-threshold operation is 
necessary. A crypto-processor is a common component in many devices. Thus it is important to 
secure the secret key of crypto-processors against power analysis attacks, especially DPA and CPA 
attacks. However, side channel analysis of this logic scheme is generally an unexplored aspect. 
Previous research has either not launched a CPA on sub-threshold or focused on only a smaller sub-
circuit of a standardized cipher, known as AES [11]. 
The ultimate objective of this thesis is to study the estimated power analysis of a sub-threshold 
circuit. However, other side channel information leakage measures, such as difference of mean 
energies (DME), frequency of observation, normalized energy deviation (NED) and normalized 




implemented at the transistor level and an AES core is implemented at the register transfer level.  An 
application-specific integrated circuits (ASIC) design methodology for sub-threshold design is used to 
implement and study such architectures. Preliminary simulations demonstrate the reduction of power 
consumption correlation with input data by lowering the supply voltage. In light of the above 
mentioned concerns, motivations and desirable preliminary results, a detailed study on the power 
analysis of sub-threshold logics is performed. 
In the first step, a power consumption analysis of an exclusive-or (XOR) gate is performed using 
DME measure to provide insight into the side channel information behavior in the sub-threshold 
region. Further investigation on basic gates is performed by analyzing averaged power consumption 
of NAND, NOR and XOR gates in various transitions by means of frequency of observation, NED 
and NSD measures. A final architecture designed at the transistor level, named parallel XORs is 
analyzed with DME and CPA measures. Afterward, measurements move to a more complex 
architecture, an important component of AES, the S-Box, and a crypto-AES processor. Correlation 
power analysis is performed on power consumption traces obtained from electronic design 
automation (EDA) tools. The challenges involved in a register transfer level (RTL) design for a sub-
threshold operation are also described. 
There is no default judgment about the side channel security of circuits operating at sub-threshold 
in this thesis. Moreover the purpose is not to prove that sub-threshold logic is either more secure or 
less secure, but to study the side channel information leakage in that region and compare it to strong 
inversion as the standard region of operation.  
1.2 Thesis Overview 
The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a literature survey on sub-threshold logics, side 
channel attacks and side channel resistant logics followed by an overview of previous research 
proposed on side channel analysis of sub-threshold logics. Methodologies used for sub-threshold 
circuits design is described in Chapter 3 which starts with an explanation of transistor level design 
and continues with details of RTL level design and digital ASIC design flow for sub-threshold. 
Chapter 4 introduces power analysis metrics used to evaluate the architectures proposed in Chapter 3. 
Simulation results and information leakage comparisons between strong inversion, sub-threshold and 
two side channel resistant logics is presented in Chapter 5. Finally, Chapter 6 summarizes and 








Background and Previous Research 
The main components of this research are digital sub-threshold logic and side channel analysis. In this 
chapter, background information required to understand later chapters is described. The first section 
explains the behavior of a transistor operating in a sub-threshold region and introduces current and 
power models of a transistor at sub-threshold. Side channel analysis attacks are explained in section 
2.2, which begins with a brief review of simple power analysis and differential power analysis. The 
section continues with a correlation power analysis introduction and ends with a discussion on side 
channel analysis measures and proposed side channel resistant logics. Previous research work 
accomplished in the area of side channel analysis of sub-threshold circuits is investigated in the final 
section of this chapter.   
 
2.1 Digital Sub-threshold Logic 
In the mid 1960’s, microwatt power consumption limitations of electronic watches drew attention to 
an unexplored aspect of newly proposed CMOS technology- the sub-threshold current. In 1972, 
Barron [12] presented a model that showed the exponential dependent of the sub-threshold current on 
the surface voltage, but did not propose any simple relationship with the gate voltage [13]. In the 
same year, Swanson and Meindl [14] explained the relationship between surface voltage and gate 
voltage. They applied their model to find the transfer characteristic of a CMOS inverter in weak 
inversion and for the first time showed that CMOS logic circuits can operate at a supply voltage as 
low as 8kT/q [13]. 
Despite all of the research undertaken since the mid 1960’s, the application of sub-threshold 
circuits was completely ignored until the mid 1990’s, when power consumption limitations especially 
for portable devices initiated a new era in sub-threshold circuit design.  
A sub-threshold circuit is defined as a circuit in which all of the transistors operate in the sub-
threshold region. Applying a power supply voltage less than the threshold of the MOS transistor 
ensures this functionality. Nowadays, sub-threshold CMOS logic has made its way into applications 
for which energy consumption is the key-metrics. The exponential relationship between the drain 
current and the gate to source voltage of an MOS transistor in the sub-threshold region gives an 
exponential reduction in power consumption, but also exponentially increases the delay [15].  
Several research projects have tried to find the minimum energy point at which the energy 
consumption of a circuit is less than any other point of the parameter space [16-20]. Calhoun shows in 
[17] that the minimum energy operation occurs in the sub-threshold region and [19] proposes an 
analytical solution to find the optimum power supply voltage, VDD, and threshold voltage, VT, to 
minimize energy for a given frequency in the sub-threshold region. Figure 2.1 shows the energy per 




and exponential increase in delay can be observed in this figure. Choosing the operating point in a 
circuit is a trade-off between energy and delay that can also be observed in Figure 2.1. One can see 
that sub-threshold circuits minimize energy consumption at a cost of slower speed. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Normalized energy per operation (top) and normalized delay (bottom) of a digital circuit as a 
function of VDD [1]. 
 
This section starts with a description of a transistor model at sub-threshold voltage and then 
provides a power consumption model based on the presented transistor model.  
2.1.1 MOS Transistor Model for Sub-threshold Operation 
Analyzing a circuit in a sub-threshold region requires an accurate MOS transistor model adapted for 
low-voltage and low-current applications. In 1995, Enz, Krummenacher and Vittoz presented a fully 
analytical MOS transistor model dedicated to the design and analysis of low-voltage and low-current 
analog circuits, known as EKV [21]. 
Figure 2.2 shows the cross section view and symbol of an n-channel MOS transistor. The value of 
drain and source voltages with respect to the pinch-off voltage divides the operation modes of the 
MOS transistor into four modes: conduction (strong inversion), blocked (weak inversion), forward 
saturation and reverse saturation. The pinch-off voltage, VP, is the gate to source voltage for which the 





Figure 2.2: Cross section view and symbol of an n-channel MOS transistor 
 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the aforementioned modes. If VD and VS are both less than VP, the channel is 
in strong inversion and the transistor works in conduction mode. Either forward saturation or reverse 
saturation occurs, depending on the sign of VD – VS, when the channel is pinched-off from the drain 
end or source end, respectively. If both VD and VS are larger than VP, the whole channel is pinched off 
and the device operates in blocked mode. If either of VD or VS is still close to the pinch-off voltage, 
the device is weakly inverted. 
 
 





According to the EKV model, the drain current can be decomposed into a forward current, IF, 
which depends only on the difference voltage VP – VS, and a reverse current, IR, which depends only 
on VP – VD. Expression 2.1 shows the equation for ID. Equations 2.2 and 2.3 evaluate the expressions 
for the forward and reverse currents in strong inversion and weak inversion, respectively. Derivations 
of these formulas can be found in [21]. 
ID = IF - IR                                                                                                        (2.1) 
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Other parameters include µn is the mobility of electrons, C
’
ox is the gate oxide capacitance per unit 
area, W is the width and L is the length of transistor. Also, Vth is the thermodynamic voltage of MOS 
transistor, Ψ0 is the surface potential constant, and ΦF is the Fermi potential. Their expressions and 
definitions are not important for this work and can be found in [21]. 
An accurate model like EKV is necessary for careful analysis of analog circuits or gate level 
circuit design, especially when the circuit operates at the weak inversion edge. However, more basic 
models exist which are able to propose a reasonable estimate of circuit behavior. Since, in the sub-
threshold region, the sub-threshold current (which is a diffusion current) dominates other components 
of the drain current, such as gate leakage and Gate-Induced Drain Leakage (GIDL), the total drain 
current can be equated to the sub-threshold current. Equation 2.7 represents this model of a sub-
threshold current [13].  




where VT is the threshold voltage of MOS transistor and I0 is the drain current when VGS = VT, as 
given in Equation 2.8: 
>    	  1 
 !                                                           (2.8) 
To model low VDS roll-off and Drain-Induced Barrier Lowering (DIBL), Equation 2.7 can be 
upgraded to Equation 2.9.  
  > "#?&%#@BC#+&A#'( 	1  "%#+&#'(                                                  (2.9) 
shere, η is the DIBL coefficient. The sub-threshold current derivation can be found in [22]. 
Figure 2.4 shows the drain current versus the gate to source voltage. As Equation 2.9 predicts and 
Figure 2.4 represents, the drain current, ID, varies exponentially with VGS in the sub-threshold region. 
As will be mentioned later, this exponential relationship in the sub-threshold region causes an 
exponential reduction in power consumption.  
 
 
Figure 2.4: ID versus VGS for a MOS transistor in 0.18µm process with nominal VDD of 1.8V [13]. 
 
Figure 2.5 compares the variation of ID with respect to VDS in strong inversion against a sub-




similar to the strong inversion curves in their shape. The quasi-linear region comes from the roll-off 
of the current at low VDS. Unlike strong inversion, the onset of this roll-off depends only on VDS and 
not on VGS. In strong inversion, the VDS dependence on the velocity saturation region results from 
channel length modulation and is commonly modeled with the early voltage. Early voltage is the 
voltage where a tangent to ID-VDS curve intercepts the voltage axis. In sub-threshold, the VDS 




Figure 2.5: ID versus VDS for three values of VGS in a 0.18µm process. a. sub-threshold, b. strong inversion [13]. 
2.1.2 MOS Power Model for Sub-threshold Operation 
The total power consumption of a digital circuit is the sum of its dynamic, static and short-circuit 
power, as given in Equation 2.10 [23]. 
Ptotal  PDynamic 4 PStatic 4 PShort-Circuit                                                                      (2.10) 
The dynamic power is evaluated by Equation 2.11. 
PDynamic  α × f × Ceff × VDD2                                                  (2.11) 
Where α is activity factor, f is the switching frequency and Ceff is the effective capacitance.  
Decreasing VDD, lowers the dynamic power quadratically. Therefore, a circuit operating in the sub-
threshold region consumes much less power than the same circuit in strong inversion with an identical 
activity factor and frequency. For instance, in 65 nm technology with a VDD of 0.9 V, a 95% reduction 
in dynamic power results by moving the VDD to 0.2 V.  





PStatic  ILeakage × VDD                                                                (2.12)                                                                                      
With lower supply voltage during sub-threshold operation, VDS is less than the VDS in strong 
inversion which results in lower leakage current and therefore lower leakage power. Depending on 
the technology and VDD scaling, the leakage power is reduced by 4 to 90 times [23]. Since the 
frequency is lower in sub-threshold operation, leakage power is integrated over a larger time, which 
makes the leakage energy increase in  the sub-threshold region. Thus, dynamic energy, which is the 
dominant portion of the total energy in strong inversion is no longer dominant at sub-threshold. In 
fact, it is even less than the leakage energy close to the minimum energy point [19]. 
Short circuit power is the power dissipated by the short circuit that flows directly between VDD and 
VSS during a switching transition. Short circuit power is shown in Equation 2.13.  
PShort-Circuit  IShort-Circuit ×VDD                                                 (2.13) 
Due to slower operation at sub-threshold, the period of short circuit in CMOS cells is increased. 
Even so, the short circuit power is a factor of the supply voltage, and thus is reduced [23]. 
2.2 Side Channel Analysis Attacks 
Secret information hidden in cryptographic devices can be extracted by passive observation of the 
device’s functional behavior or active manipulation of the device to behave abnormally and extract 
secret information from the intentional abnormality. The first category is generally referred to as side 
channel attacks (SCA), and the latter as fault injection attacks. 
Side channel attacks break a cryptographic device by exploiting information from the physical 
characteristics of the device, such as power consumption [8], electromagnetic radiation [9] and run 
time [10]. Recording many samples of instantaneous power consumption (known as a power trace) of 
a device and analyzing it to exploit secret information, such as a key, is called a power analysis 
attack.  
Power analysis of side channel signals from smartcards was first presented in 1999 by Kocher et 
al. [8] on a DES algorithm. Instantaneous power consumption of a cryptographic device normally 
depends on the data it processes and the operation it performs. Power analysis attacks are based on 
exploiting these dependencies, and various methodologies are introduced to achieve this goal. Simple 
power analysis (SPA), differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA) are 
the most common types of power analysis methodologies.  
This section reviews SPA and DPA as the first proposed methods of power analysis attack. It then 
provides a brief introduction to CPA, as the method used in this research. Next, measures for 
analyzing the side channel information leakage are briefly listed. Finally, a few of the side channel 
resistant logics presented thus far will be introduced and SABL and WDDL (the ones which are 




2.2.1 Overview of Simple Power Analysis and Differential Power Analysis 
SPA attacks exploit information by simply measuring the instantaneous power consumption of a 
device and correlating its fluctuations with the different rounds of cryptographic algorithms or 
operations and key values. In other words, an attacker tries to find the key by directly interpreting the 
single available trace to find patterns or matched templates. On the other hand, DPA attacks extract 
the key by performing statistical analysis on a large number of power traces to find out how power 
consumption, at fixed moments in time, depends on the processed data. DPA attacks are thus based 
on the data dependency of power traces [24]. 
While SPA attacks require detailed knowledge about the implementation of the cryptographic 
algorithm, DPA attacks only need to know the algorithm itself. Although several SPA attacks on 
algorithms like AES have been reported [25, 26], it is much easier to prevent the threat of these 
attacks compared to DPA attacks. However, SPA is the sole possible method when only one power 
trace is available. DPA attacks require a large number of traces and their runtime is significantly 
longer than that of SPA’s.  
DPA works based on the difference between power consumption of 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 transitions. It 
collects N power traces corresponding to N plaintexts, Pi (i = 1 … N), and chooses a selection 
function, f, which operates on Pi, Ks (the guess key), and bit b, the examined bit (e.g. a bit of the S-
Box output). The output of the selection function can be either 0 or 1. The next step is to compute a 
differential trace ∆f (b), which is the difference between the average of traces with f equals 1 and with 
f equals 0. Expression 2.14 summarizes the described methodology. W(Pi) is the power trace 
corresponding to the plaintext Pi.  
_̂	`   ∑ _	b,d,ef 1	bgbhi∑ _	b,d,efgbhi  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b,d,ef 1	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b,d,efgbhi                                       (2.14) 
If calculated bits during the cryptographic algorithm are uniformly distributed and the number of 
power traces are sufficient, ∆f (b) corresponding to a wrong Ks will be zero. Thus, the only ∆f(b) 
which gives the value of nonzero reveals the correct key [27]. 
In order to enhance DPA, extended attacks, such as higher order DPA (HO-DPA) [8, 28], multi-bit 
DPA [29, 30] and correlation power analysis (CPA) [31, 32], are proposed. The difference between 
these methods is mainly in the complexity of the statistical analysis. Correlation power analysis, as an 
effective and commonly used approach, is chosen as the attack methodology in this research.  
2.2.2 Correlation Power Analysis 
Correlation power analysis (CPA) attacks are based on the correlation between the power 
consumption of the cryptographic device and the Hamming weight or Hamming distance of the 
handled data. In power analysis attacks, it is necessary to have a power model that maps data values 
processed by the device to the power consumption traces. Specifically, in a DPA attack, the selection 




1 to 0 transitions. However, the power models used in CPA, Hamming weight [33] and Hamming 
distance [31] assume that 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 transitions contribute equally to power consumption and 
that 0 to 0 and 1 to 1 transitions also lead to the same power consumption. It is assumed in CPA that 
information leakage through power consumption depends on the number of bits switching from one 
state to another at a given time, not the type of transition. 
The Hamming weight of a vector input v0, HW(v0), is defined as the number of set bits in v0, and it 
is assumed that the power consumption is proportional to HW(v0). The Hamming distance of two 
vector inputs v0 and v1, HD(v0, v1), is the number of flipping bits to go from v0 to v1. In a Hamming 
distance model, the power consumption of the device is modeled with the number of bits switching 
from one state to either its preceding or succeeding state, while in a Hamming weight model the 
knowledge of the current state is sufficient. Therefore, a Hamming distance model requires more 
details of the device and may not be possible to mount in all applications.  
Brier et al. proposed a model for power consumption based on the Hamming distance model in 
[31]. The Brier’s model can be seen in Expression 2.15. 
W = a HD(D,R) + b                                                         (2.15) 
This model assumes a linear relationship between power consumption, W, and the Hamming 
distance between D, a uniform random variable, and a reference state, R. This model only represents 
the data-dependent part of power consumption, which does not seem unrealistic because the majority 
of a cell’s power is consumed within the bus lines [31]. Constant b models enclose offsets, time-
dependent components, and noise.  
The correlation factor ρWH between power consumption and the Hamming distance can be 
calculated as follows: 
k1l  m/n	1,lopoq                                                           (2.16) 
where σ
2
 is variance, we have:  
r1  s rl 4 rd                                                        (2.17) 
So, expression 2.15 can be further simplified to expression 2.18. 
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                                        (2.18) 
where m is the number of bits in D as a uniform random variable and m/2 is the mean and m/4 is the 
variance of HD(D+R) as a uniform random variable. The correlation factor is a value between -1 and 




Expression 2.18 shows that a minimized noise variance, σb
2
, maximizes the correlation factor, 
which helps to determine the reference state, R. The process is to scan all possible values of R and 
rank them by the correlation factor. The one with the maximum correlation factor is the correct 
reference value.  
The above claim is proved in [31]. Suppose a correct reference, R, and an incorrect guess of the 
reference value, R’, which has k bits different from R. This would give, HD(R+R’)=k. Since b is 
independent from other variables, the correlation factor is: 
k1l{  m/n	tlvd,l|opo{q  top m/n	l,l
|
o{q  k1lkll{  k1l  y*}y                      (2.19) 
Expression 2.19 shows that even a 1 bit difference between R and R’ reduces the correlation factor 
by 1/4.  
In summary, in order to perform a CPA attack, a power model based on the Hamming weight or 
Hamming distance must first be chosen. In the next step, the device needs to be run with all possible 
values of a reference state or input plaintext, and a power consumption trace has to be measured. In 
the final step, the correlation factors between the predetermined values from the power model and 
measured power traces are calculated and the maximum correlation factor corresponds with the 
correct key of the device.  
2.2.3 Measures for Side Channel information leakage 
Various measures exist to evaluate side channel information leakage of cryptographic devices. CPA 
can be considered as an effective and accurate measure that not only reveals the secret key but also 
analyzes the amount of information leakage using obtained correlation coefficients. Other than CPA, 
simpler measures are also introduced that can be employed to study the data and operation 
dependency of instantaneous or averaged power consumption of a device. The following paragraph 
gives a brief overview of some of most commonly used measures which will be discussed in further 
detail in Chapter 4. 
Difference of mean energies (DME), suggested by [34], is a measure which highlights the 
difference between power traces that process 1 compared to those that process 0. The frequency of 
observation measure used in [35] visualizes the closeness of average power consumption values for 
all possible inputs. This measure is based on the fact that attacking a system whose average power 
consumption values for various combinations of inputs are aggregated in a small range requires more 
effort and sample traces than a system with a wider range of averaged power consumption values. 
Normalized energy deviation (NED) and normalized standard deviation (NSD), first used by [35], 
form another type of measure that provides a simple yet effective security evaluation for many logic 
schemes. They quantize the previous measure, frequency of observation, and determine the dispersion 




2.2.4 Side Channel Resistant Logics 
The important key to designing a secure cryptographic device is to eliminate data dependency and 
operation dependency of power consumption. A device which consumes constant energy in all clock 
cycles of an operation can be a perfectly secured design. A circuit with constant energy consumption 
and power trace for all types of transitions-0 to 1, 1 to 0, 1 to 1 and 0 to 0-satisfies our desired goal. 
 Figure 2.6 shows an Inverter in Static Complementary CMOS logic (scCMOS), which is the 
default logic scheme available in existing standard cell libraries. This cell consumes power from the 
power supply only during 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 transitions. Since the load capacitance is different in these 
two cases, the consumed power during these two transitions is different. No power is consumed 
during 0 to 0 and 1 to 1 transitions. Thus, this logic scheme leaks high amounts of information. A 
secure logic scheme must have output switching independent of input switching as well as constant 
load capacitance for all transitions [35].  
 
 
Figure 2.6: Output transitions in a static complementary CMOS logic [35]. 
Various logics are proposed to provide the above characteristic. Sense Amplifier Based Logic 
(SABL) [35], Wave Dynamic Differential Logic (WDDL) [36], Dynamic Current Mode Logic 
(DyCML) [37], Low-Swing Current Mode Logic (LSCML) [38] and Masked Dual-Rail Pre-charge 
Logic (MDPL) [39] are examples of the presented logics. Mace et al. summarizes the characteristics 
of mentioned logics in [40], as shown in Table 2.1. 
 
Logic styles Dual-Rail Masked Pre-Charged Standard Cell 
CMOS     
SABL     
WDDL     
DyCML     
LSCML     
MDPL     




According to Table 2.1, all side channel resistant logics are dual-rail and pre-charged. SABL, 
DyCML and LSCML are full custom logic styles, while WDDL and MDPL are compatible with 
standard cell libraries. In this research, SABL and WDDL are chosen for study and comparison. 
Following is a brief overview of these two logic schemes.  
Figure 2.7.a illustrates a differential network. This network provides true and false values of the 
output signal with the help of De-Morgan’s law. De-Morgan’s law generates a false output using false 
inputs. The truth table of this network is shown in Figure 2.7.a. Since both out and out’ signals flip in 
each transition of 1 to 0 and 0 to 1, the total power consumption of this differential network is the 
same for 1 to 0 and 0 to 1.  
Figure 2.7.b demonstrates a dynamic network. Here, the clock period is divided into two phases: 
pre-charge and evaluation. In the first phase, the output signal is pre-charged to the pre-charge value.  
In the latter phase, output is evaluated based on inputs. This modification in the circuit makes the 
output flip in 0 to 0 and 1 to 1 transitions; hence, it always consumes power. As the truth table of 
Figure 2.7.b demonstrates, power consumption for 0 to 1 and 1 to 1 transitions are identical, as is 
power for 0 to 0 and 1 to 0. 
Combining differential and dynamic schemes into one dynamic and differential logic scheme 
provides almost the same power consumption for all clock cycles. SABL and WDDL are two 
dynamic and differential logics. The implementation of NAND, NOR and XOR gates in these two 
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A generic n-gate in SABL logic is shown in Figure 2.8. The differential pull-down network along 
with the output pre-charge circuit provides the same power consumption for all transitions. SABL is 
also designed to have a constant load capacitance for all transitions. Implemented NAND, NOR and 
XOR gates in the SABL logic scheme are shown in Figure 2.9. DPDN is designed such that the 
conducting path in all possible paths has the same resistance, which is ensured by having the same 
number of identical transistors in each conducting path of the DPDN network [24].  
SABL logic can only be used in custom design. It is impossible to use standard cell libraries and 
available digital design tools to design a SABL circuit. This issue, together with the significantly 
large power consumption caused by almost doubling the total number of transistors, is a major 









Figure 2.9: SABL gates a) NAND b) NOR b) XOR. 
  
2.2.4.2 WDDL 
Figure 2.10 represents NAND, NOR and XOR gates in a WDDL logic scheme. The first difference 
between WDDL and SABL is that available standard cell libraries can be employed in designing a 
circuit in WDDL logic. Therefore, this logic scheme provides the capability of an RTL design of a 
secure circuit in WDDL logic, using the available digital design tools.  
 
 





The second difference is the pre-charging methodology. Figure 2.11 shows the pre-charge circuit 
for combinatorial WDDL gates. In WDDL, inputs are pre-charged and the pre-charge signals at 
inputs ripple all the way through the combinatorial circuit to the output, where they pre-charge the 
output. Having a pre-charge circuit for the inputs eliminates the necessity of having this circuit for all 
gates. Hence, the area and power consumption of a WDDL gate is lower than the area and power 
consumption of the same gate in SABL logic. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: WDDL pre-charge circuit [36]. 
2.3 Previous Side Channel Research of Sub-threshold Circuits 
Extensive research has been carried out in the area of sub-threshold circuits. However, side channel 
information leakage of this logic scheme is still relatively unexplored. To the best of our knowledge, 
only three papers, [41-43], all published in 2008, have focused on studying information leakage of 
sub-threshold against differential power analysis attacks. 
Alstad and Aunet implemented a static CMOS 8-bit ripple carry adder in [41] and a compact 4-
staged pipelined and asynchronous S-Box in [42]. Both circuits were simulated at the transistor level 
using 90 nm CMOS technology. They used normalized standard deviation of the supply current as the 
measure of security and claimed that sub-threshold operation reduces the standard deviation with a 
factor of 2500. Normalized standard deviation was introduced in section 2.2.3. It is not a very strong 
measure of security especially when it is used individually and it will be discussed in more detail later 
in Chapter 4.  
Haider and Nazhandali mounted a DPA attack on an S-Box in which SPICE-level simulation is 
performed on a transistor level design implemented in 45 nm technology [43]. Their focus is on the 
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of the sub-threshold circuit versus strong inversion. Figure 2.12 represents 
their simulation results, showing in part “a” the minimum average noise power that hides the secret 
key and defeats the DPA attack. According to their results, there are four orders of magnitude 
difference between the noise power required to cover the secret in sub-threshold and strong inversion. 




for sub-threshold mean that less noise is needed to cover the secret information at sub-threshold 
compared to strong inversion. 
 
 
Figure 2.12: Analysis of a secure circuit resistivity toward power analysis attacks [43]. 
  
In summary, side channel analysis of sub-threshold circuits has been previously studied in three 
papers, in which normalized standard deviation and signal-to-noise ratio of a transistor level AES S-
Box and an 8-bit ripple carry adder are the main focus. However, further studies on sub-threshold 
logics are required. A closer look into instantaneous power consumption of a circuit operating in a 
sub-threshold region can demonstrate the information leakage behavior of this logic scheme. 
Moreover, correlation power analysis attack is also a serious threat that sub-threshold logics 
vulnerability against this attack needs to be studied. Finally, side channel analysis of register transfer 
level implementation of sub-threshold circuits is another unexplored aspect of this logic that is 
considered in this research.  
The next chapter will study the circuits used for power analysis in this research and propose the 










Sub-threshold Circuits and Design Methodology 
This chapter discusses the methodology and challenges of designing a circuit for sub-threshold 
operation. In section 3.1 a list of challenges which a designer will confront in designing a circuit for 
sub-threshold operation is presented. In section 3.2, which focuses on transistor level design, the 
characteristics of an inverter gate at sub-threshold provide a basis for transistor level design which is 
used in the subsequent design of other gates, such as NAND, NOR and XOR. Afterwards, register 
transfer level design is presented in section 3.3. The digital design flow of a sub-threshold circuit is 
explained in that section followed by a performance analysis of standard cell libraries and the 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) crypto-processor used in this research. 
 
3.1 Design Challenges at Sub-threshold 
While a circuit operating in sub-threshold region consumes little power, low current level and an 
exponential dependence of current to voltage introduce a group of deficiencies and challenges which 
need to be considered by designers. This section briefly describes some of the more important design 
challenges.  
1. Performance 
The weak current flow in sub-threshold circuits results in longer delays due to the longer time 
required to charge and discharge capacitances in the circuit. As mentioned earlier in this section, there 
is a trade-off in choosing the value of VDD between delay and energy. Choosing the value of VDD 
higher than corresponding value for minimum energy point can benefit the performance at only a 
slight cost in energy. 
2. Minimum Operational Voltage  
The supply voltage of 3-4 Vth (Vth, the thermal voltage equal to kt/q) is the minimum possible VDD 
for circuits operating at sub-threshold [23]. The Voltage Transfer Characteristic (VTC) of a 
minimum-sized inverter at 25°C in a 65 nm TSMC process is sketched for different values of supply 
voltage in Figure 3.1.  
3. Variability 
Exponential I-V characteristics in a sub-threshold region can cause a large variance in transistor 
behavior, including process, voltage and temperature variability. Hence, a designer needs to use 







Figure 3.1: VTC as a function of supply voltage [23] 
 
4. Device Optimization 
Devices optimized for strong inversion may not give optimal results for sub-threshold operation. 
The optimization of devices for sub-threshold operation can thus help to achieve higher frequencies 
[44]. 
5. Robustness of logic families 
Low VDD results in a reduced ION/IOFF ratio that can reduce robustness. Static CMOS gates function 
correctly at sub-threshold; however, other logic families may suffer from variations due to low 
ION/IOFF ratio [44].  
6. Standard Cell Libraries 
The simulation and synthesis of sub-threshold circuits is a great challenge due to the unavailability 
of standard cell libraries designed specifically for sub-threshold operation. Current standard cell 
libraries are characterized for a specific voltage which is in the strong inversion region. Thus, the 
synthesis of circuits at sub-threshold requires re-characterization and modification of libraries. 
3.2 Transistor Level Design 
This section describes the design methodology for transistor level sub-threshold circuits. An 
exponential dependency of the drain current on VDS alters the transistor’s behavior and introduces a 
new design methodology. This section studies the characteristics of an inverter circuit (e.g. sizing, 
speed, frequency of operation and minimum operational voltage) to provide a general idea of a 
transistor level circuit in a sub-threshold region. The section also provide a design explanation of the 
most important components of every digital circuit (NAND, NOR and XOR gates). All 
implementations and simulations are performed in Cadence Virtuoso Analog Environment using 65 





Figure 3.2: Sub-threshold transistor level design flow. 
3.2.1 Inverter Operation in Sub-threshold Region 
The first design element to be discussed is transistor sizing which can be studied from three points of 
view. One is, the ratio of PMOS width to NMOS width, at which the circuit operates with the 
minimum VDD. The ratio WP/WN that obtains the same current for both PMOS and NMOS transistors 
provides the minimum VDD operation. Reference [13] suggests the value of 12 for WP/WN to achieve 
the minimum voltage of 50 mV. However, based on the available transistor model for this research, 
which is the general purpose model of the 65 nm TSMC process, a lower WP/WN value gives better 
functionality in sub-threshold voltages. Therefore, a minimum supply voltage operation occurs for the 




The next factor that impacts sizing is the propagation delay. Based on experiments done in this 
research on inverters for different sub-threshold voltages in the range of 0.1 V to 0.3 V, the ratio of 
2.7 was observed as the best ratio of WP/WN to provide equal rising and falling propagation delay. 
Inverter sizing to achieve the minimum energy is the last criterion that occurs with minimum 
transistor sizing. Hence, the smallest sized NMOS transistor should be chosen and, depending on the 
application the ratio of PMOS to NMOS transistor can be set. 
The inverter delay in both strong inversion and sub-threshold, in case of symmetrical PMOS and 
NMOS transistors is given by Equations 3.1 and 3.2, respectively [13].  
td = 
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As Equation 3.2 presents, an exponential decrease of Ion in the sub-threshold region leads to an 
exponential dependency of delay on VDD, which is a stronger dependency compared to the strong 
inversion delay presented in Equation 3.1. Figure 3.3 shows the normalized inverter speed across the 
full range of supply voltage. The inverter speed degrades slowly in strong inversion and drops fast for 
VDD below 0.4 V. 
 





Taking into consideration the minimum size for an NMOS transistor and the value of 2 for WP/WN, 
the inverter is tested for various supply voltages in the sub-threshold region. The output voltage of the 
inverter for VDD = 200 mV, 150 mV, 75 mV and 50 mV is shown in Figure 3.4. For supply voltages 
of 200 mV and 150 mV, the circuit maintains a full 10% - 90% output swing. Although this swing is 
degraded for VDD = 75 mV, the output voltage still covers the 10% - 90% swing. From a supply 
voltage of 60 mV, the output swing degrades drastically and the inverter can no longer be considered 
operational. The degraded output swing of the inverter for a supply voltage of 50 mV can be observed 
in Figure 3.4.d. Therefore, the minimum operational voltage using the available models in this 
research is 60mV. 
Now that the sizing, speed and minimum operational voltage are determined, the maximum 
frequency of operation can be obtained. The output voltages of the inverter for the frequencies of 10 
MHz, 33.33 MHz, 50 MHz and 66.67 MHz are shown in Figure 3.5. The operational voltage is 150 
mV. We can observe that the output voltage swing starts to degrade from 50 MHz and then cannot 
maintain the 10% - 90% swing at a frequency of 66.67 MHz (the period of 15 ns). Thus we can see 
that, the limited range of operational frequency is a significant drawback of sub-threshold circuits. 
Based on the available models in this research, the maximum frequency is around 70 MHz.  
 
Figure 3.4: Inverter output at the frequency of 10 MHz and supply voltages of a) VDD = 200 mV,  b) VDD = 150 





Figure 3.5: Inverter output for the supply voltage of 150 mV and frequencies of a) f = 10 MHz, b) f = 33.33 
MHz, c) f = 50 MHz and d) f = 66.67 MHz. 
 
3.2.2 NAND Gate Operation in Sub-threshold Region 
The architecture of the NAND gate is the same as the static CMOS architecture for strong inversion 
NAND gate, the only difference being the transistor sizing. In strong inversion, it is better to set the 
WP/WN ratio around two to equalize the low-to-high and high-to-low propagation delays. However, as 
mentioned in the previous section, this ratio has to be one to achieve the minimum operational 
voltage.  
Table 3.1 summarizes the characteristics of the NAND gate in the sub-threshold region. The 
minimum VDD at the frequency of 10 MHz is 100 mV, and the maximum frequencies of operation at 
voltages of 200 mV and 150 mV are 125 MHz and 40 MHz, respectively. The drastic decrease in 






Minimum supply voltage @ 10 MHz 100 mV 
Maximum frequency @ 200 mV 125 MHz 
Maximum frequency @ 150 mV 40 MHz 
Table 3.1: Characteristics of a static CMOS NAND gate in sub-threshold. 
3.2.3 NOR Gate Operation in Sub-threshold Region 
Similar to a NAND gate, the architecture of a NOR gate in sub-threshold region is the same as a static 
CMOS NOR gate in strong inversion, transistor sizing being the only difference. The ratio of PMOS 
to NMOS width is minimized to obtain the minimum operational voltage.  
Table 3.2 summarizes the characteristics of a NOR gate in sub-threshold region. Maximum 
frequencies at 200 mV and 150 mV remain the same as for a NAND gate. However, the minimum 
supply voltage is a bit higher than for a NAND gate and occurs at 120 mV. 
 
Minimum supply voltage @ 10 MHz 120 mV 
Maximum frequency @ 200 mV 125 MHz 
Maximum frequency @ 150 mV 40 MHz 
Table 3.2: Characteristics of a static CMOS NOR gate in sub-threshold. 
3.2.4 XOR Gate Operation in Sub-threshold Region 
The XOR architecture used in this research is shown in Figure 3.6. Eight transistors are used to form 
the XOR gate. Following the aforementioned rule for WP/WN, this ratio is set to minimum. Table 3.3 
provides an overview of the XOR gate characteristics. Since this gate includes more transistors than 
the previous two gates and has a more complex architecture, the output voltage swing starts to drop 
sooner. The minimum supply voltage at which the 10% - 90% output swing is achieved is 130 mV. 
The maximum frequency at supply voltage of 200 mV is 90 MHz, which decreases to 40 MHz for a 
supply voltage of 150 mV. 
 
Minimum supply voltage @ 10 MHz 130 mV 
Maximum frequency @ 200 mV 90 MHz 
Maximum frequency @ 150 mV 40 MHz 





Figure 3.6: Static CMOS XOR architecture. 
3.2.5 Parallel XORs 
Since XOR is one of the most important components of a cryptographic hardware, further 
investigations on this specific gate are provided. In addition to a single XOR, another architecture 
which is used in this research for side channel analysis is a set of eight parallel XOR gates that takes 
an 8-bit input and produces an 8-bit output using an 8-bit key. This architecture is shown in Figure 
3.7. Differential and correlation analysis of this gate is presented in Chapter 5. 
 
 





3.3 RTL Design 
Designing a complete crypto-processor for encryption algorithms, such as AES, at the transistor level 
that includes thousands of transistors requires an enormous effort. Computer Aided Design (CAD) 
tools have reduced both the design effort and time required for large designs. The design flow starts 
by describing the architecture using an HDL language, such as Verilog HDL. After simulating and 
verifying the functionality of the design, RTL design is synthesized to a gate level design using a 
logic-synthesis tool like Synopsys Design Compiler. The logic-synthesis tool utilizes a standard cell 
library to synthesize an RTL circuit into a gate level circuit and also provides timing information. The 
next step is post-synthesis simulation and timing analysis. Depending on the application, power 
measurements can be performed using a switching activity file and the gate level netlist. The last step 
involves placement, routing and post-layout simulation.  
Sub-threshold digital design flow, including the details on the tools, is discussed in section 3.3.1, 
followed by a discussion of the performance of standard cell libraries at a sub-threshold voltage in 
section 3.3.2. AES and S-Box architectures used in this research are explained in last two sections.  
3.3.1 Sub-threshold Digital Design Flow 
The digital design flow of a sub-threshold design is the same as the one for strong inversion. 
However, standard cell libraries used to synthesize RTL into gate level require some modifications. 
Figure 3.8 presents an overview of the sub-threshold digital design flow used in this research. 
The major difference of this flow with the strong inversion design flow is in the left branch of 
Figure 3.8. As standard cell libraries are characterized for a specific voltage which is in the strong 
inversion region, the operation voltage of these cells needs to be changed. The Cadence Encounter 
Library Characterizer (ELC) [45] is a tool that characterizes a standard cell library for user-defined 
setups. ELC inputs are: 
• A SPICE-format sub-circuit file which includes all the details of transistor devices, 
resistances and capacitances of each standard cell. 
• A SPICE-format device model file that describes the transistor device models. 
• A setup file which defines device parameters for different process corners, supply 
voltages, temperatures, input slew rates and output loads. 
• A configuration file (elccfg) which contains environment variables or setup directives 
which will be used during the run. 
ELC receives the mentioned inputs and analyzes the SPICE-format sub-circuit, recognizes the 
function or logic structure and generates the function or logic model. It then defines the 
characterization environment by user-defined parameters in the setup file. In the last step, it invokes 
and executes SPICE, summarizes the results, and generates an ALF file which can be converted to 
library formats. Following are the commands to perform the above steps. Additional details can be 
















db_open foo          #opens a database 
db_prepare –force    #creates environment for running SPICE simulation 
db_gate         #recognizes the design and creates gate file 
db_spice -s spectre -p typical -keep_log     #SPICE simulation 
db_output –r foo.alf.rep –alf foo.alf –p subth    #outputs alf file 
db_verilog –r foo.v        #generates a Verilog logic description 
db_close 
alf2lib –alf foo.alf –lib subth.lib      #converts .alf to .lib file 
 
The output library database contains the timing, power, and noise model for each of the standard 
cells, based on the parameters defined in the setup file. Modification of the standard cell library 
occurs in this first step, and the setup file used has to be modified for the sub-threshold region. Next, 
the process corner, supply voltage, input slew rate and output load have to be defined for sub-
threshold voltage. 
Synopsys Design Compiler (DC) [47] is the logic-synthesis tool utilized in this research. DC’s 
inputs are standard cell library and behavorial description of the design in Verilog or VHDL. As will 
be seen in section 3.3.2, some cells in standard cell libraries do not exhibit acceptable performance in 
the sub-threshold region; hence, these cells need either to be avoided or modified to be able to work 
in a circuit operating in sub-threshold. The Design Compiler converts a behavioral Verilog file to a 
structural file using determined standard cells. Design Compiler is capable of using only some 
specified cells or avoid using some specified cells in conversion as long as the circuit is achievable 
with allowed cells.  




In order to authorize the Design Compiler to only use Cell3 and Cell4, we can use following 
commands. 
set_dont_use my_lib/* 
remove_attribute my_lib/Cell2 dont_use 
remove_attribute my_lib/Cell3 dont_use 
PrimeTime PX [48] is an add-on to Synopsys PrimeTime that obtains an accurate power 
dissipation analysis based on the circuit connectivity, switching activity, net capacitance and cell-
level power behavior data in the Synopsys database format (.db) library. PrimeTime PX supports two 
modes of power analysis: the averaged and the time-based. In this research, the latter mode is of 
interest.  
PrimeTime PX reads in the gate level netlist, Synopsys design constraint file, parasitic file, 




power analysis and generate a power waveform. The power waveform can be used later for 
correlation power analysis. Following are commands used in PrimeTimw PX to obtain the power 
waveform.  
 
set power_enable_analysis TRUE 




#       link design 
####################################################################
# 
set search_path    "search_path1 search_path2 search_path3" 
set link_library " * my_lib.db" 
 






#       set transition time / annotate parasitics 
####################################################################
# 














#       read switching activity file 
####################################################################
# 
















Mentor Modelsim [49] is used to generate a switching activity file. This file contains the switching 
activities on all nodes through the circuit and is a key file in the power estimation process. Following 
are commands used to generate this file. These commands should be called after a simulation is 
started in Modelsim.  
 
vcd file switching_activity.vcd 
vcd add -r  testbench/DUT/* 
run    Run_Time 
vcd2wlf -nocase  switching_activity.vcd switching_activity.wlf 
wlf2vcd -o Output_switching_activity.vcd switching_activity.vcd 
 
The last two commands are necessary due to incompatibilities between Synopsys and Mentor 
Graphics in naming signals. In order to resolve this issue, we can convert the vcd file to a wlf file and 
then convert the wlf file back to the vcd format. 
3.3.2 Standard Cell Library Performance in Sub-threshold 
As mentioned earlier, standard cell libraries are not specifically designed to operate in the sub-
threshold region. The characterization of libraries for sub-threshold was the first required 
modification described. Nevertheless, not all cells in a library perform well in sub-threshold. The 
authors in [13] evaluated the performance of a 0.18 µm standard cell library in a sub-threshold 
operation, as shown in Figure 3.9. It shows the lowest operational VDD for various cells in the library 
at typical, fast-slow and slow-fast corners.  
If all cells in a standard cell library function properly at sub-threshold, the functionality of a circuit 
synthesized using this library is guaranteed [13]. Thus, a cell that fails to operate at that region has to 
be isolated from the library used by the logic-synthesis tool to produce a functional circuit for sub-
threshold. This is the second required modification on standard cell libraries. Cells that exhibit the 
worst performance below the threshold voltage of a transistor are logic gates with a stack of series 
devices (e.g. And/Or/Invert (AOI)), logic gates with multiple devices in parallel, and flip-flops [13]. 
These cells have to be modified to be able to operate in sub-threshold region or be isolated from the 





Figure 3.9: Standard cell functionality in synthesized FIR filter using normal cell selection over process corners 
(simulation) (© 2005 IEEE) [13]. 
 
3.3.3 AES Crypto-Processor 
An Advanced Encryption Standard [11] core used in this research is a compact 8-bit AES core 
proposed in [50]. The high-level architecture of this core is shown in Figure 3.10. All data paths are 
8-bit wide. This core is implemented in Verilog HDL and synthesized using 65 nm TSMC standard 
cell library. 
The interface unit provides the requisite handshake signals to enable the core to perform as a co-
processor. The control unit is responsible for producing control signals and clocking all registers at 
the proper time. The ShiftRows unit is a series of shift registers whose inputs are controlled by 
multiplexers. The MixColumn unit contains a few registers whose input is the XOR of the previous 
register and a multiple of the input. ShiftRows and MixColumn operate on one row and one column 
of data, respectively, which is 32 bits; however, the data path width of this architecture is 8 bit. 
Employing multiple-shift registers and a parallel to a serial converter introduces multiple layers of 
pipeline that enable the processor to receive 8-bit inputs at a time and to process them. 
The most complex block of this core is SubByte, which is also called S-Box. In order to reduce the 
area and achieve efficiency, elements of GF(2
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. The XOR gate is the most frequently used gate in this block and in other blocks 






Figure 3.10: High-level architecture of the AES crypto-processor [50]. 
 
Figure 3.11 presents the data path of the AES core. The core is able either to encrypt or decrypt 
the input plaintext. Pipelining enables the core to receive 128-bit plaintext and key in 16 consecutive 
clock cycles through the input ports, data_in and key_in. After 10 rounds of AES encryption, which 
takes 160 clock cycles, the ciphertext comes out of the data_out port in 16 cycles. Thus, the total 
encryption period is 176 cycles. Moreover, due to the 16 levels of pipeline, a new plaintext and key 
can be uploaded into the cores in the last 16 cycles while the previous ciphertext is arriving at the 
output. This feature improves the performance of the design in long runs and decreases the number of 
total cycles from 176 to 160. 
During encryption, the key expands parallel to the encryption process. However, since AES is a 
symmetric key algorithm and the same key is used for decryption, the first 160 clock cycles of the 
decryption process is devoted to the key expansion. Once the fist byte of the expanded decryption key 
is produced, decryption starts and takes 176 clock cycles. Hence, the total decryption happens in 336 
clock cycles as opposed to 176 cycles of encryption. More detailed information about each block can 
be found in [50]. The CPA attack, which will be described in Chapter 4, occurs at the data_out node 





Figure 3.11: AES core data path [50]. 
3.3.4 S-Box Block 
The substitution block of AES is also studied individually. The architecture is shown in Figure 3.12. 
In this architecture, the 8-bit plaintext is first exclusive-ored with an 8-bit key and the result sent to an 









Side Channel Information Leakage Measurements and Analysis 
In order to perform a successful side channel attack on a system, the attacker has to be able to exploit 
information about the secret key through side channel measurements and recover the secret key from 
the extracted information [51]. Power consumption is used in this research as the system 
characteristic that leaks information. The instantaneous power consumption of the design under study 
is assumed to be known by the attacker. The attacker’s job is to recover the secret key with possession 
of power traces and knowledge about the encryption algorithm.  
This chapter defines mathematically and illustrates the measures introduced briefly in section 
2.2.3, to evaluate the side channel information leakage of circuits proposed in Chapter 3. Section 4.1 
explains difference of mean energies (DME), highlighting the difference between power traces that 
process 1 compared to those that process 0. Frequency of observation is explained in section 4.2 to 
demonstrate how the security level of a circuit can be visualized in histograms. The chapter continues 
by providing more details about normalized energy deviation (NED) and normalized standard 
deviation (NSD), in section 4.3. As mentioned earlier these measures quantize the dispersion of 
average power consumption values of a cryptographic device for various data transitions. The last 
measure is correlation power analysis (CPA), which is an extension of the differential power analysis 
introduced by Kocher et al. [8]. This is the most effective measure that investigates the actual 
possibility of finding the secret key from the power trace using correlation analysis. Section 4.4 
describes the usage of CPA in this research. 
 
4.1 Difference of Mean Energies (DME) 
As mentioned earlier, power consumed in a circuit changes with respect to inputs due to variant 
current paths and output capacitance loads. This fact forms the basis of DME measure.  
Suppose that n different plaintexts are applied to the system shown in Figure 4.1 and their 
corresponding power traces, E0 to En, are recorded. The attacker chooses a partitioning function, f, in 
order to separate the recorded traces into two groups. The partitioning function might be the lsb of 
some expected intermediate data. However, an attacker does not have access to the key and the 
intermediate data value is calculated based upon a guess of the key. The parameters T0 and T1 shown 
in Expression 4.1 are generated using the partitioning function f. Values f0 to fn are the outputs of 
function f. 
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Figure 4.1: Crypto-system with fixed key and n different plaintexts. 
 
Now that two sets of power traces, T0 and T1, are generated, the mean of each set has to be 
calculated. M0 and M1 are the means of T0 and T1, respectively. DME represented in Equation 4.2 is 
the difference between M0 and M1. Please note that DME itself is a trace over time. 
DME = | M0 - M1 |                                                          (4.2) 
For an ideally secure system, a DME signal must be always 0. The highest peak in this signal 
represents the point in time where the system’s behavior is most correlated to the key. Hence, having 
a group of DME signals obtained by various key guesses and consequently multiple partitioning 
function values, the DME signal with the highest peak corresponds to the correct key. 
In chapter 5, DME is used to evaluate the XOR gate and parallel XOR architecture (from Chapter 
3). In the case of XOR gate, power traces for input transitions of 0 to 1 and 1 to 0, having a fixed key 
of 0, are measured. The same experiment is repeated with a fixed key of 1. Obtained power traces 
from two cases of sub-threshold and strong inversion are used to compare the system correlation on 
input’s type of transition. For the parallel XORs architecture, 8-bit input varies from 0 to 255 and 
power traces are recorded having K0 (lsb of the key) equals to 0 once and again with K0 equal to 1. 
The mean of the traces in each group is measured to find M0 and M1 signals. Comparing the DME 
signal of sub-threshold against strong inversion is one way to compare their correlation to the secret 




4.2 Frequency of Observation 
Frequency of observation is a visual measure that helps to observe the dispersion of average power 
consumption values generated by different inputs combinations. This measure is used in some papers, 
such as [35]. This measure is applied on three basic gates in chapter 5, NAND, NOR and XOR, in 
sub-threshold, strong inversion, SABL and WDDL logic schemes. They are provided with all 
possible combinations of inputs transitions that produce 0 to 1, 1 to 1, 1 to 0, and 0 to 0 transitions. 
For instance, for a 0 to 1 transition in a 2-input gate, there are four combinations of inputs transitions.  
Assuming each transition happens in one clock cycle, power consumption is averaged over each 
cycle. To obtain the frequency of observation histogram, averaged power consumption values 
corresponding to all possible combinations of inputs are obtained and the frequency of occurrence of 
the obtained values are plotted. Figure 4.2 demonstrates the frequency of observation for two systems, 
one completely secure and the other completely insecure. The horizontal axis shows the averaged 
power value and the vertical axis represents frequency of observation. It is assumed that the number 
of possible combinations of inputs is 10. For the insecure system, the averaged power value for each 
transition is different from other transitions, and hence the frequency of each averaged power value is 
one; such a system is easily breakable by analyzing power consumption. On the other hand, if a 
system consumes the same value of power in all clock cycles, the power consumption of this system 
does not reveal any information about the transition occurring inside the system and makes it 
impossible to break it. The system shown in grey in Figure 4.2 is an example of a secure system.   
Figure 4.3 shows frequency of observation for two real systems (to be detailed in Chapter 5). One 
can see that, for System 1, averaged power values are spread over a smaller range compared to 
System 2. Thus, power consumption of System 2 is more correlated to its input transitions, and 
observing its power consumption reveals more information about the secret key.  
Therefore, while frequency of observation is not a measure to accurately evaluate a system’s 
vulnerability against power analysis, it does provide a simple and effective visual tool to estimate the 
behavior of a system with a limited number of input transition combinations. This measure is 






Figure 4.2: Frequency of observation, secure system vs. insecure system. 
 
 





4.3 Normalized Energy Deviation (NED) and Normalized Standard Deviation 
(NSD) 
Formulating frequency of observation leads to the definition of normalized energy deviation and 
normalized standard deviation. As in the previous section, these two measures take averaged power 
consumption per cycle as input and indicate the variance of the power values. NED is defined in 
Formula 4.3. 
   t0	/mm* 	/mmt0	/mm                                                (4.3) 
NED produces a value between 0 and 1. The smaller the variation in power values, the smaller the 
value of NED. This makes the attack more complex and required more measurements. A narrow 
range of power values in the frequency of the observation diagram results in a small NED value. 
Although NED has been used in many papers thus far, it may result in an unfair comparison. Figure 
4.4 presents two systems with the same value of NED. However System 1 can be considered a more 
secure system, since its power values are located in a narrower range.  
 
Figure 4.4: Systems with same NED value but different levels of security. 
 
In order to address issues like the one in Figure 4.4, another measure, called NSD, is defined in 
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NSD measures how averaged power values are located around their mean. If they are spread 
widely around the mean, NSD is larger, and if they are close to the mean, NSD is smaller. In the latter 
instance, the system is more secure. The NED value for both systems in Figure 4.4 is 0.83; however, 
the NSD value is 0.25 for System 1 and 0.47 for System 2, signaling the higher security level of 
System 1.  
NSD is not a completely accurate measure. Figure 4.5 shows two systems with the same level of 
power variation and thus the same level of security; however, NSD for System 1 is about half of the 
NSD for System 2. The reason is that while both systems have almost the same amount of standard 
deviation, the mean for System 1 is about twice that of System 2. NED is equal for both systems, so it 
provides a more precise measure in this situation.  
 
 
Figure 4.5: Systems with same level of security but different values of NSD. 
 
As a result, NED and NSD are two simple but effective measures that provide security evaluation 
of systems with limited number of input transition combinations. Although they have been used in 
various papers, they are not completely accurate and they must be used carefully. In this research, we 
have used these two measures along with frequency of observation to evaluate three basic gates, 




4.4 Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) 
Correlation power analysis is the most accurate measure among the presented measures. It not only 
provides correlation coefficients which can be used to compare various systems, but also reveals the 
secret key. We have used CPA to attack the S-Box block of the AES algorithm and the AES 
architecture itself. We have also used CPA to study the correlation between key and power 
consumption in the parallel XORs architecture shown in Figure 3.7.  
The CPA process is built in three stages: 1. Power consumption matrix acquisition; 2. Predicted 
power consumption matrix generation; and 3. Correlation matrix generation. Each step is described in 
detail in the following sections. 
4.4.1 Power Consumption Matrix Acquiring 
This stage includes writing a suitable testbench and running a simulation on the design under test to 
acquire all power traces corresponding to a fixed key and all possible plaintexts.  
An S-Box block under attack is shown in Figure 3.12. The key is fixed and the plaintext takes all 
possible values from 0 to 255. The testbench is written in such a way that the ciphertext Ci, 
corresponding to the plaintext Pi, is generated in one clock cycle. In the next clock cycle, output is set 
to 0. Figure 4.6 provides an overview of this testbench. 
 
 
Figure 4.6: S-Box testbench for generating power traces. 
 
The next step is producing power traces using the procedures described in Chapter 3. Generated 
power trace is a long file that has to be processed in MATLAB to extract 256 traces corresponding to 
256 different plaintexts. The final matrix is shown in Figure 4.7. Each row of this matrix is a power 
trace for one fixed plaintext, and each column shows instantaneous power consumption at time ti for 
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Figure 4.7: Power traces matrix generated from simulation. 
 
The testbench for AES is different, because an encryption process takes 175 clock cycles rather 
than just one clock cycle in S-Box. Also, the plaintext and key are both 128-bit wide instead of 8-bit 
wide. The key in the AES testbench is fixed (the same as the S-Box testbench) but instead of varying 
the plaintext over the whole possible range (which includes 2
128
 different values) only the lowest 8 
bits of the plaintext vary from 0 to 255. Each plaintext remains unchanged for 175 clock cycles to let 
the output ciphertext appears, after which it proceeds to the next value. Thus, 256 encryption 
operations occur, consecutively. Applying PrimeTime PX to AES using the mentioned testbench 
generates a very long power trace that requires careful manipulation in MATLAB to generate the 
power trace matrix. The matrix is the same as that in Figure 4.7; however, total time, T, for AES is 
much longer than the one for S-Box. 
The same methodology is used for parallel XORs architecture to acquire the power traces for all 
256 possible plaintexts. Despite S-Box and AES, simulation and power measurements are performed 
at the transistor level in Cadence Virtuoso Analog Environment. The testbench runs the architecture 
with 256 plaintexts consecutively, which takes 256 clock cycles to complete. As with S-Box and 
AES, the rest of the procedure manipulates the long power trace obtained from Cadence to create a 
power traces matrix the same as the one in Figure 4.7. 
4.4.2 Predicted Power Consumption Matrix Generation 
In this stage, one needs to set up the attack point and generate a predicted power consumption matrix 
based on either the Hamming distance model or the Hamming weight model. As mentioned in 
Chapter 3, the attack point in AES architecture is at the Data_out node in the first round. The output 




the XORed value of plaintext and key can be used to generate the desired matrix. The matrix is a 
256×256 matrix, for which each element can be calculated using Expression 4.5. 
PredictedPoweri,j = Hamming_Weight(Pi + Kj)                                     (4.5) 
where Pi is the i
th
 plaintext and Kj is the j
th
 key. Both Pi and Kj are assumed to be 8-bit. Therefore, 
each element of the matrix can take a value between 0 and 8. The models used are Hamming weight, 
however, since the testbench of S-Box generates a 0 between each pair of plaintext, the Hamming 
distance model also has the same formula as the one in Expression 4.5. 
The attack point in the parallel XOR architecture is the output of XORs. The model used for this 
architecture is the Hamming distance one. Expression 4.6 presents the formula used to generate the 
predicted power matrix.  
PredictedPoweri,j = Hamming_Distance(Pi + Kj , Pi-1 + Kc)                        (4.6) 
where Kc is the correct key. It is assumed that the correct key is known because the purpose of this 
case is not revealing the secret key and we are interested in studying the correlation between the key 
and power consumption using the proposed model. 
4.4.3 Correlation Matrix Generation 
In this stage, the correlation between the power traces matrix obtained by simulation and the 
predicted power matrix generated in MATLAB will be calculated. The output correlation matrix’s 
size is 256×T, with each row corresponding to a correlation trace over time for a key guess. The 
MATLAB code to generate this matrix is as follows. 
for i=1:T 
    for j=1:256          
      Correlation=corrcoef(power_traces(:,i),predicted_power(:,j)); 
      Corr_trace(j,i)=Correlation(1,2); 
    end 
end 
The inner loop correlates column i of the power_trace matrix with all 256 columns of the 
predicted_power matrix and saves them in column i of the Corr_trace matrix. Since columns of 
power_trace represent time and columns of predicted_power represent keys, column i of Corr_trace 
contains the correlation coefficients of all keys at time i.  
After 256 iterations, when one time slot is completed in the inner loop, the outer loop moves to the 
next time slot in the power_trace matrix. This operation repeats for T iterations. At the end, each row 
in the Corr_trace matrix represents the correlation coefficients of a key over time. Figure 4.8 






Figure 4.8: One iteration of outer loop to calculate the correlation matrix. 
 
Once the correlation matrix is completed, we have 256 correlation traces. In order to find the 
correct key, the highest peak of each trace must be determined. If the maximum peak value occurs for 
the key k, it means that k has the highest correlation with obtained power traces; hence, the secret key 




Figure 4.9 demonstrates an example of a correlation trace for a correct key compared to one for a 
wrong key. Electromagnetic radiation of a synthesized ASIC during a DES operation is measured in 
[27] and led to the traces in Figure 4.9. We can observe that the maximum peak occurs in a trace that 


























This chapter evaluates the architectures discussed in Chapter 3 based on the measures introduced in 
Chapter 4 and presents the simulation results. It also compares side channel information leakage in 
different logic schemes including SABL, WDDL, strong inversion and sub-threshold. The chapter 
opens by analysis of the power consumption behavior of an XOR gate in sub-threshold versus strong 
inversion in transition of output from 0 to 1 and 1 to 0, using the DME measure. This study is the first 
glance at differences between sub-threshold and strong inversion. In order to further highlight the 
difference between the behavior of power consumption in sub-threshold and strong inversion 
confronting various transitions, the parallel XORs architecture is evaluated based on the DME 
measure from Section 2. 
The chapter continues with comparisons of NAND, NOR and XOR gates in SABL, WDDL, sub-
threshold and strong inversion logic schemes. Frequency of observation is the first applied measure 
that provides a visual overview of the security performance of the various logic schemes. Then, NED 
and NSD are calculated to create a numeric scale for comparison. In the previous section, utilizing 
XOR and parallel XORs, instantaneous power consumption was employed; in this section, however, 
averaged power consumption per clock cycle is used for evaluation.  
In the last section, correlation power analysis is performed on parallel XORs, S-Box and AES. 
Comparison of correlation coefficients between sub-threshold and strong inversion is the area of 
interest for architectures in the last section. 
 
5.1 XOR Gate Analysis with DME Measure 
The power consumption behavior of an XOR gate in sub-threshold region is compared to the same 
gate in strong inversion in this section. First, power waveforms generated using different transitions 
are provided. Spikes in the power waveform which contain the main information hidden in the trace 
can be observed. In the next part, the difference between power traces generated during the transition 
of data from 0 to 1 and from 1 to 0 with either key value of 0 or 1 is studied. This difference forms the 
main tool to compare sub-threshold and strong inversion. In the last part of this section, the difference 
of mean energies measure is again used. However, difference signals in the last part come from the 
difference between power traces of identical data transitions but with different keys. 
5.1.1 Power Waveforms at Sub-threshold and Strong Inversion 
The XOR gate studied in this section is a two input gate, with one input called Key and the other 
called Data. Apart from minor changes in load capacitance, frequency and supply voltage, 




inversion and 0.1 fF at sub-threshold. Frequency of operation is considered 1 GHz for strong 
inversion and 20 MHz for sub-threshold. The circuit is powered with a 1 V supply voltage in strong 
inversion and a 200 mV supply voltage at sub-threshold.  
The testbench keeps the Key fixed at 1 and raises Data to 1 from 0. It then drops it to 0 and repeats 
this operation with the Key fixed at 0. The testbench also performs this experiment with the reverse 
transition of Data, i.e. from 1 to 0 and 0 to 1. Figures 5.1 to 5.4 show the power waveforms for strong 
inversion in the left window and input and output signals in the right windows. Figures 5.5 to 5.8 






Figure 5.1: Strong inversion power waveform at left for XOR circuit, with plots on the right (top to bottom) of , 






Figure 5.2: Strong inversion power waveform at left for XOR circuit, with plots on the right (top to bottom) of , 
key, input data and output data for Key=0 and Data=1->0->1. 
 
 
Figure 5.3: Strong inversion power waveform at left for XOR circuit, with plots on the right (top to bottom) of , 





Figure 5.4: Strong inversion power waveform at left for XOR circuit, with plots on the right (top to bottom) of , 
key, input data and output data for Key=1 and Data=1->0->1. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: Sub-threshold power waveform at left for XOR circuit, with plots on the right (top to bottom) of , 





Figure 5.6: Sub-threshold power waveform at left for XOR circuit, with plots on the right (top to bottom) of , 
key, input data and output data for Key=0 and Data=1->0->1. 
 
 
Figure 5.7: Sub-threshold power waveform at left for XOR circuit, with plots on the right (top to bottom) of , 





Figure 5.8: Sub-threshold power waveform at left for XOR circuit, with plots on the right (top to bottom) of , 
key, input data and output data for Key=1 and Data=1->0->1. 
 
The presented power waveforms provide an overview of the XOR gate’s behavior in sub-threshold 
and strong inversion. Nevertheless, a closer look into the close range around the spike signals is 
necessary and provides a more realistic image. The main reason is that the period of signals in Figures 
5.1 to 5.4 is 1ns, while the period is 50 ns for sub-threshold in Figures 5.5 to 5.8. Power traces are 
sketched over sample numbers to provide the required view. Figure 5.9 shows power waveforms in 
each case of 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 Data transitions for Key equal to 1 and Key equal to 0. The same 
sketches are given in Figure 5.10 for sub-threshold.  
The first point to notice here is that the higher level of similarity in power traces of sub-threshold 
compared to strong inversion. As mentioned earlier, power traces for various transitions in an ideally 
secure system must completely match. Thus, although the XOR gate operating in sub-threshold 
illustrates a higher quality in power traces at first glance, later sections analyze these traces more 
precisely.  
Although side channel information leakage measurements may occur in instantaneous power 
traces, averaged power consumption per clock cycle can also be used to compare averaged power 
required for a 0 to 1 transition versus a 1 to 0 transition. Table 5.1 demonstrates the averaged power 
values for strong inversion and Table 5.2 shows these values for sub-threshold. Each transition takes 
two clock cycles. For instance, in the first row of Table 5.1, first two columns are the averaged power 
values to complete a 0 to 1 transition in two clock cycle and the last two columns show the values to 





Figure 5.9: A Closer look at power spikes for strong inversion for a) key=1, 0-1 transition b) key=0, 0-1 
transition c) key=1, 1-0 transition d) key=0, 1-0 transition. 
 
Figure 5.10: A Closer look at power spikes for sub-threshold for a) key=1, 0-1 transition b) key=0, 0-1 





 Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3 Cycle 4 
Key=1,Data=1→0→1 10.6 0.0811 0.5038 0.0144 
Key=1,Data=0→1→0 0.516 0.0158 10.45 0.0786 
Key=0,Data=1→0→1 0.487 0.0143 10.49 0.0838 
Key=0,Data=0→1→0 10.63 0.0871 0.4745 0.0146 
Table 5.1: Averaged power values for strong inversion (grey cells are related to 0 to 1 transition in output), with 
values in µW. 
 
 
 Cycle 1 Cycle 2 Cycle 3 Cycle 4 
Key=1,Data=1→0→1 564.5 151.2 484.7 117.3 
Key=1,Data=0→1→0 488.7 117.3 547.1 145.8 
Key=0,Data=1→0→1 440.2 130.8 528.5 226.0 
Key=0,Data=0→1→0 533.5 233.9 442.9 130.8 
Table 5.2: Averaged power values for sub-threshold (grey cells are related to 0 to 1 transition in output), with 
values in pW. 
  
Based on the values of Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the average power consumed in a 0 to 1 transition of 
the output is 5.31 µW for strong inversion and 366 pW for sub-threshold. The value for a 1 to 0 
transition on the output is 0.260 µW for strong inversion and 294 pW for sub-threshold. These values 
demonstrate that the average power consumed at sub-threshold region to raise the output signal to 1 
from 0 is almost the same as the power consumed to drop it back to 0. On the other hand, these 
average values for strong inversion are starkly different. The ratio of the average power for 1 to 0 
transition to the average power for 0 to 1 transition is 80% for sub-threshold but, only 5% for strong 
inversion. 
The level of the operation voltage is the most important factor that makes the situation worse for 
strong inversion. However, the frequency of operation and output load capacitance are also involved. 
The testbench has tested each circuit in its real operational point to make a judgment between sub-
threshold and strong inversion with the required characteristics of each region. Therefore, although 
testing a circuit in strong inversion with a very low frequency and low load capacitance may result in 





5.1.2  DME Signals for Fixed Keys 
Power traces for all combinations of fixed Key and 0-1-0 and 1-0-1 pulses on Data were obtained in 
the previous section. In this section, the difference between a power trace for a 0 to 1 transition and 1 
to 0 transition with a fixed Key of either 0 or 1 is studied. Expression 5.1 shows the calculation of 
DME signal in this section. 
 DME0 = | |power_0to1| - |power_1to0| |  for key = 0                   (5.1) 
DME1 = | |power_0to1| - |power_1to0| |  for key = 1 
Figures 5.11 to 5.14 show the difference signals of the same case for sub-threshold and strong 
inversion, plotted in one figure.  
 
 
Figure 5.11: DME0 signals for Key=0 and Data=0->1->0 for a) Strong Inversion b) Sub-threshold.  
 





Figure 5.13: DME1 signals for Key=1 and Data=0->1->0 for a) Strong Inversion b) Sub-threshold. 
 
 
Figure 5.14: DME1 signals for Key=1 and Data=1->0->1 for a) Strong Inversion b) Sub-threshold. 
 
Since the absolute value is considered for DME, it is expected that difference signals for the Key 
of 0 will have reasonable similarity. Comparing Figures 5.11 and 5.12 confirms our expectation. The 
same similarity also exists between Figure 5.13 and Figure 5.14 for Key of 1.  
The first point to note in these signals is that the average of strong inversion’s DME is higher than 
the average of sub-threshold, which means that the difference signals for sub-threshold are closer to 
zero most of the time. Sub-threshold has either one or two spikes in DME, which results from the 
mismatched spike times in power traces. Since the power trace’s peaks for 0 to 1 and 1 to 0 




The second point to note to be made in relation to the presented signals is peak value. Table 5.3 
summarizes the results using the ratio shown in Expression 5.2 for sub-threshold and strong 
inversion. The lower the value of PeakRatio, the better the security characteristics of the circuit.  
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It can be observed that PeakRatio of sub-threshold, for the Key equal to 1, is about half of the ratio 
for strong inversion, indicating fewer information leaks from the power trace at sub-threshold. The 
ratio for Key equals to 0 is almost the same for both logics with a slight advantage for strong 
inversion. Another interesting point in Table 5.3 is that all of the ratios for sub-threshold are almost 
equal. 
 
 Strong Inversion Sub-threshold 
Key=1,Data=1→0→1 17% 6.5% 
Key=1,Data=0→1→0 16% 6.7% 
Key=0,Data=1→0→1 3.8% 6.7% 
Key=0,Data=0→1→0 5.1% 6.8% 
Table 5.3: PeakRatio for strong inversion and sub-threshold in various cases. 
 
The third point is the absolute value of the peak. The maximum peak value for strong inversion is 
about 2×10
-4
, which is almost 300 times the maximum peak value for sub-threshold, 6×10
-6
. Since the 
level of the power is also an important factor in side channel analysis, where low current and power 
levels may lead a failed attack or may force the attacker to collect more traces, sub-threshold has an 
important advantage in this aspect.  
5.1.3 DME Signal for Fixed Data Transitions 
In this section the DME calculation method is different from the previous section. Here, the Data 
transition is fixed and DME is the difference between the power trace corresponding to Key of 0 and 
the power trace corresponding to the Key of 1. Expression 5.3 presents the mentioned method in 
formula. Figures 5.15 and 5.16 show this new set of DME signals for sub-threshold and strong 
inversion. 
 
       DME0to1 = | |power_key0| - |power_key1| |  for Data = 0→1                    (5.3) 




Figures 5.15 and 5.16 also propose a higher level of security for sub-threshold versus strong 
inversion. One can observe that the DME signal for sub-threshold is just one or two spikes, while it is 
a nonzero signal for most of the shown time window for strong inversion. A higher level of power 
consumption can also be seen in these figures.  
 
 
Figure 5.15: DME signals for Data = 0→1 for a) Strong Inversion b) Sub-threshold. 
 
 





5.2 Parallel XORs Architecture Analysis with DME Measure 
The parallel XORs architecture previously shown in Figure 3.7 is simulated with all 256 possible 
inputs (b) and fixed key (k) of 5C and 5D. An important fact about the choice of 5C and 5D is that 
one has the lsb of 0 and the other has the lsb of 1. After simulation, 256 power traces corresponding 
to the applied inputs are obtained. Mean signals, M0 and M1, are the average of signals in set T0 and 
T1, shown in Expression 5.4, respectively. DME is calculated using Formula 4.2. 
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Figure 5.17 shows DME signals for strong inversion and sub-threshold. Like the previous 
conclusions, two important advantages can be observed in sub-threshold signals. First, the DME of 
sub-threshold is, on average, closer to zero. Second, the similarity between difference signals of sub-
threshold for key of 0 and key of 1 is greater than the similarity between those for strong inversion. 
Hence, the parallel XORs architecture at sub-threshold demonstrates enhanced security performance 
in comparison to strong inversion.  
 
 





5.3 NAND, NOR and XOR Gates Analysis with Frequency of Observation 
Measure 
The frequency of observation was introduced in section 4.2. In this section, averaged power 
consumption per clock cycle values for designs under investigation are obtained by simulation and 
used to plot the frequency of observation or frequency of occurrence of each power value. The test 
gates for this experiment are NAND, NOR and XOR, in all logic schemes of SABL, WDDL, sub-
threshold, and strong inversion. Each of the test gates, has two inputs, and each input experiences four 
transitions (0-0, 0-1, 1-0 and 1-1). Thus, there are 16 different possible combinations of transitions. 
These input transitions and the output transition for NAND, NOR and XOR gates are represented in 
Table 5.4 and are tested with all possible transitions and the averaged power consumption is 
measured for each.  
 
in1 in2 NAND-out NOR-out XOR-out 
0-0 0-0 1-1 1-1 1-1 
0-0 0-1 1-1 1-0 1-0 
0-0 1-1 1-1 0-0 1-1 
0-0 1-0 1-1 0-1 1-0 
0-1 0-0 1-1 1-0 0-1 
0-1 0-1 1-0 1-0 0-0 
0-1 1-1 1-0 0-0 1-0 
0-1 1-0 1-1 0-0 1-1 
1-1 0-0 1-1 0-0 1-1 
1-1 0-1 1-0 0-0 1-0 
1-1 1-1 0-0 0-0 0-0 
1-1 1-0 0-1 0-0 0-1 
1-0 0-0 1-1 0-1 1-0 
1-0 0-1 1-1 0-0 1-1 
1-0 1-1 0-1 0-0 0-1 
1-0 1-0 0-1 0-1 0-0 
Table 5.4: Testbench. 
 
The frequency of the clock signal in SABL, WDDL and strong inversion is chosen to be 1 GHz, 
which is a reasonable frequency for an individual gate. The frequency for the circuits at sub-threshold 
is chosen to be 20 MHz. The supply voltages for SABL, WDDL and strong inversion are 1 V, and the 
supply voltage at the sub-threshold is 200 mV. 





5.3.1 NAND Gate 
Figure 5.18 compares SABL with strong inversion. This histogram shows that while the observed 
energies are spread out in a broad range for strong inversion, they remain in a narrow band for SABL. 
However, the average power consumption of SABL is more than five times the power consumption 
of SE. 
Since both logic schemes are tested under the same testbench, the narrow band of the energies for 
SABL shows less correlation between power consumption and inputs. Thus, SABL is a more secure 
logic against power analysis attacks. 
 
 
Figure 5.18: SABL vs. strong inversion for the number of observed energies per cycle (NAND). 
 
Figure 5.19 demonstrates the same type of comparison between WDDL and strong inversion. It 
can be seen that the energies per cycles for WDDL remain in a narrow band while they spread out for 
strong inversion. As mentioned, this finding means that WDDL is more secure than strong inversion 
and that its power consumption is also significantly greater than strong inversion’s.  
Comparing SABL and WDDL can also prove useful. Figure 5.20 represents this comparison. As 
this histogram shows, the energies of SABL are closer than those of WDDL. Hence, SABL is a more 





Figure 5.19: WDDL vs. strong inversion for the number of observed energy per cycle (NAND). 
 
 





Finally, Figure 5.21 demonstrates a comparison between sub-threshold and strong inversion. The 
power consumption of the sub-threshold is about 1000 times less than strong inversion’s, so, in order 
to compare the two, the power value of sub-threshold in this histogram is scaled by 1000. The 
histogram shows that the average power values of strong inversion are more widely spread out. 




Figure 5.21: Strong inversion vs. sub-threshold for the number of observed energy per cycle (NAND). 
 
5.3.2 NOR Gate 
The same comparisons have been done for NOR gates. Figures 5.22 to 5.25 present the results. Here, 
the same conclusion as for the NAND gate can be made for the NOR gate. SABL’s histogram has the 
narrowest width, followed by WDDL’s. However, these two logic schemes consume substantially 
more power than strong inversion, which itself consumes 1,000 times more power than sub-threshold. 
Sub-threshold has also shown less variation in power compared to strong inversion, which means less 






Figure 5.22: SABL vs. strong inversion for the number of observed energy per cycle (NOR). 
 
 





Figure 5.24: SABL vs. WDDL for the number of observed energy per cycle (NOR). 
 
 




5.3.3 XOR Gate 
XOR gate has the same behavior as the previously described gates; however, in XOR the average 
power consumption for the transition from 0 to 1 is significantly larger than others. The reason can be 
found in the architecture of the XOR gate, which generates many glitches before the pull-up network 
is completely turned on. Figures 5.26 to 5.29 show the frequency of observation histograms for the 
XOR gate.  
 
Figure 5.26: SABL vs. strong inversion for the number of observed energy per cycle (XOR). 
 





Figure 5.28: SABL vs. WDDL for the number of observed energy per cycle (XOR). 
 
 




5.4 NAND, NOR and XOR Gates Analysis with NED and NSD Measures 
NED and NSD were introduced in section 4.3. Averaged power values, presented in the histograms in 
the previous section, are used to calculate NED and NSD based on Expressions 4.3 and 4.4. Table 5.5 
demonstrates the mean, standard deviation, NED, and NSD for all three gates. The mean and STD are 
in µW for SABL, WDDL and strong inversion, and in nW for sub-threshold. 
 
 NAND NOR XOR 
    Logic 
Measure 
SABL WDDL S.I. Subth. SABL WDDL S.I. Subth. SABL WDDL S.I. Subth. 
Mean 2.41 2.13 0.34 0.17 2.41 2.13 0.63 0.31 2.4 6.57 2.87 0.377 
STD 0.03 0.09 0.58 0.14 0.03 0.09 0.88 0.29 0.02 0.22 4.62 0.152 
NED 0.03 0.17 1.00 0.95 0.03 0.16 1.00 1.00 0.02 0.10 1.00 0.79 
NSD 0.01 0.04 1.47 0.80 0.01 0.04 1.41 0.94 0.01 0.03 1.61 0.40 
Table 5.5: NED and NSD values for NAND, NOR and XOR gates. 
 
The first noticeable point in Table 5.5 is the extremely low values of NED and NSD for SABL and 
WDDL logic schemes. While these two logic schemes are the most secure ones, they consume 
noticeably more power. Among strong inversion and sub-threshold, the later one not only consumes 
about 1000 times less power, but also its power values have less variation. Lower values of NED and 
NSD for sub-threshold in comparison to strong inversion confirms that power traces of a circuit 
operating at sub-threshold leak less information.  
Lower levels of NED and NSD values for the XOR gate in sub-threshold compared to the same 
logic for NAND and NOR is most probably caused by the output load capacitance. The load 
capacitance for NAND and NOR gates are 1fF; however, this value for XOR is 0.1 fF. The reason is 
that in the XOR, the load capacitance value is a fraction of the load capacitance in strong inversion 
which the scaling value is the ratio of the operation frequency in strong inversion to the operation 
frequency at sub-threshold.  
5.5 Parallel XORs Architecture Analysis with CPA Measure 
As mentioned earlier, the parallel XORs architecture shown in Figure 3.7 is simulated with all 256 
possible inputs (b) and fixed key (k) of 5D and 5C. An important feature of 5D and 5C is that one has 




inputs are obtained. The CPA methodology described in section 4.4 is used to obtain the correlation 
trace matrix (Corr_trace). The power model used here is Hamming distance.  
Various experiments are performed on the Corr_trace matrix. First, it is used to reveal the correct 
key. The absolute value of maximum peaks and their indexes of each of 256 traces are stored in other 
arrays. Let’s call the array containing the maximum peak values, Max_Corr_Coeff. The index 
corresponding to the maximum value of Max_Corr_Coeff gives the correct key. In simpler terms, the 
key containing the highest correlation peak compared to all other keys is the correct key. A CPA 
attack executed on the correlation matrices of both sub-threshold and strong inversion was able to 
detect the correct key for both 5C and 5D. Figure 5.30 demonstrates the Max_Corr_Coeff traces, 
arrays of maximum correlation values, for both strong inversion and sub-threshold. The correlation 
coefficient of the correct key, 5D, is shown. Figure 5.30.c represents the difference of two histograms 




Figure 5.30: Maximum Correlation Coefficients for correct key = 5D, for a) Strong Inversion b) Sub-threshold 





Figure 5.31: Maximum Correlation Coefficients for correct key = 5C, for a) Strong Inversion b) Sub-threshold 
c) Difference of strong inversion and sub-threshold. 
 
The maximum correlation values of both logics are almost the same, with slightly more weight on 
the strong inversion side. However, parts c of Figures 5.31 and 5.30 show that the correlation 
coefficients of strong inversion are generally more than the sub-threshold’s coefficients. Specifically, 
strong inversion’s correlation coefficients are on average about 0.05 greater than sub-threshold’s. 
Thus, we can deduce that the power consumption of the parallel XOR architecture at sub-threshold 
correlates less with its input. Nevertheless, the crucial factor that likely makes the attack harder (and 
is not possible to show in simulation) is the power level. Power consumption of this architecture at 
sub-threshold is 100 times less than strong inversion’s, which makes the power analysis attack much 
more difficult.  
Figure 5.32 presents the absolute value of the difference between the maximum correlation 
coefficients, Max_Corr_Coeff, of key 5C and key 5D for strong inversion and sub-threshold. The 
smaller this difference, the more secure the device. As can be seen in Figure 5.32, the difference is 
graeter for strong inversion. The maximum difference is 0.4 for strong inversion, but just 0.12 for 







Figure 5.32: Difference of Max_Corr_Coeff traces for Key=5C and Key=5D, for a) Strong Inversion b) Sub-
threshold. 
The correlation trace of the correct key is shown in Figures 5.33 and 5.34 for keys of 5D and 5C, 
respectively.  
 






Figure 5.34: Correlation coefficient traces corresponding to the correct key, 5C, for a) Strong Inversion b) Sub-
threshold. 
The final point worth noting here is the time at which the power trace correlates with the acquired 
power model. Figures 5.35 and 5.36 illustrate the time of correlation for each key guess.  
 






Figure 5.36: Time of occurring correlation for each key guess and correct key of 5C, for a) Strong Inversion b) 
Sub-threshold. 
 
Figures 5.35 and 5.36 demonstrate that time steps for sub-threshold is more than those for strong 
inversion. Since the scaled time is actually the sample numbers, more time steps in strong inversion 
might have happened because of more glitches around the correlation time and, thus result in more 
recorded samples by the Cadence. When more samples are recorded, correlation time variations may 
increase.  
5.6 Correlation Power Analysis Attack 
So far, all mentioned measures were applied to the transistor level designs. Hence, the only required 
tool to extract power traces is Cadence Virtuoso Analog Design Environment. From here on, S-Box 
block and Advanced Encryption Standard core will be the focus of attacks and studied for their 
amount of information leakage. Since custom designing these architectures is a time consuming 
process, the goal of this project is to employ ASIC design methodologies, described in section 3.2, to 
implement these complex architectures and perform the power analysis study on them. 
Designs in strong inversion are successfully implemented and power consumption traces are 
obtained and studied by CPA. Indeed most challenging part of this research was setting up the tools 
required to synthesize designs at sub-threshold. Intense and continuous efforts were made to gather 




bugs and difficulties, such as library issues and Spectre simulation failure challenged the setting up of 
the Cadence Encounter Library Characterizer. Issues and errors were referred to CMC Microsystems 
and Cadence. After a few months of follow-up, Cadence informed us that dp_spice commands fails 
due to some raw directory issues. A Cadence Change Request was submitted to the R&D team for 
troubleshooting, but unfortunately, this process took a long time. Therefore, we could not characterize 
the available standard cell library for sub-threshold operation and have not been able to attain any 
simulation result from sub-threshold logic at this time. Simulation results of strong inversion logic 
will be provided here and hopefully, in the near future, we will be able to add sub-threshold results to 
this research to complete the work. More details about the ELC issues are provided in Appendix A. 
The next section presents the strong inversion results of S-Box and AES results will follow in 
section 5.6.2. 
5.6.1 S-Box Analysis with CPA Measure 
The architecture of the S-Box block described in Section 3.3.4 is the second architecture attacked 
with CPA. The architecture simulated with the testbench presented in section 4.4.1 and the Hamming 
distance model is used to acquire the correlation trace, Corr_trace, as explained in section 4.4.3. 
Like the CPA attack on Parallel XORs architecture, the key with the highest peak value compared 
to other keys is the correct key. The CPA attack mounted successfully on S-Box and the detected key 
was exactly equal to the correct key for various tested keys. Figure 5.37 demonstrates the maximum 
correlation trace and shows, 5C as the correct key. Figure 5.38 shows the correlation trace 
corresponding to the correct key. 
 





Figure 5.38: Correlation coefficient trace corresponding to the correct key, 5C. 
5.6.2 AES Analysis with CPA Measure  
The AES architecture described in section 3.3.3 is the last architecture attacked with CPA. The 
architecture simulated with the testbench presented in section 4.4.1 and Hamming weight model is 
used to acquire the correlation trace, Corr_trace, as explained in section 4.4.3. 
The first difference between the attack on S-Box and AES is the power model. For S-Box, the 
model is the Hamming distance, and for AES, the model is Hamming Weight. The second difference 
is the size of the power traces that is significantly larger for AES, so, the attack takes longer to 
complete compared to S-Box. Figure 5.39 demonstrates the maximum correlation trace. The correct 
key, 5C, is also determined. Figure 5.40 shows the correlation trace corresponding to the correct key. 
The difference in maximum correlation between S-Box and AES is also noticeable. It is 0.96 for 
S-Box while, it is about the half, 0.5, for AES. This shows that implementing an attack on a full AES 
core requires more measurements, traces and time. 
The MATLAB Code written for the CPA attack on AES is provided in Appendix B. Parallel 
XORs and S-Box’s codes are similar to AES’s Code, with a slight difference in the attack model, and 
the size of traces. There are also some differences in importing traces into MATLAB between AES 
and Parallel XORs, since AES traces come from PrimeTime PX while Parallel XORs traces come 
from Cadence. However, changes are easy to make and there is no need to provide an individual code 






Figure 5.39: Maximum Correlation Coefficients for correct key = 5C. 
 
 





Conclusions and Future Works 
6.1 Summary and Discussion 
In this thesis, side channel information leakage of the sub-threshold logic scheme against power 
analysis attacks was explored and compared with strong inversion logic, as the standard logic of 
operation, and against Sense Amplifier Based Logic (SABL) and Wave Dynamic Differential Logic, 
as the two of most referenced side channel resistant logics. 
An XOR gate was analyzed with difference of mean energies (DME) measure to provide an 
overview of power consumption behavior at sub-threshold operation. Instantaneous power 
consumption waveforms in different transitions and with keys of 0 and 1 were obtained. Comparisons 
showed not only that the power level of a circuit at sub-threshold region is significantly lower than 
strong inversion’s, but also that its power traces are more similar in different transitions and have less 
variation. In order to provide more detailed comparisons, DME measure was applied on power traces 
in experiments with fixed data transitions and fixed keys. In nearly all cases, the XOR gate showed 
less power variation and hence, less information leakage in sub-threshold operation.  
NAND, NOR and XOR gates were also studied with frequency of observation, NED, and NSD 
measures. They were simulated with all possible input transitions to obtain the averaged power 
consumption for each transition. Despite the XOR gate measured with DME, instantaneous power 
trace was not used, but, the power consumption was averaged in each clock cycle to reflect the 
averaged power value for each transition. Frequency of observation was used as a visualized measure 
and showed the dispersion of averaged power values. As expected, SABL and WDDL presented 
small dispersion in power values in comparison to strong inversion and sub-threshold. However, they 
consume more energy which is their major drawback. Sub-threshold showed less dispersion in power 
values and hence, more security compared to strong inversion. Lower values of NED and NSD were 
obtained for sub-threshold compared to strong inversion, thus re-emphasizing its lower information 
leakage. Nevertheless, the sub-threshold cannot compete with SABL and WDDL.  
Parallel XORs architecture was the next architecture tested. It was first analyzed with DME 
measure, after which power consumption traces were separated based on the lsb of input plaintext 
into two groups. Difference between the mean of these groups demonstrated two points: that the 
DME of sub-threshold is closer to zero on average (which shows better security) and, that DME 
signals for a key of bit value 1 and a key of bit value 0 are more similar compared to strong inversion. 
Once again this result leads to lower leakage of key information.  
Subsequently, the correlation power analysis (CPA) attack was performed on parallel XORs 
architecture. The CPA attack was able to reveal the correct key in both sub-threshold and strong 
inversion; however, maximum correlation coefficients corresponding to the correct key and most of 
the guessed keys were lower for the circuit operating at sub-threshold. The experiment was executed 




maximum correlation coefficient traces for the lsb of key equals 0 and lsb of key equals 1 showed that 
strong inversion is about three times more than sub-threshold’s. Indeed, all experiments showed that 
although the simulated CPA attack breaks the device for both logics, the correlation between power 
consumption and inputs is less for sub-threshold than strong inversion.  
The final architectures, S-Box and AES, were implemented using RTL design methodologies and 
attacked by CPA. Both architectures had a successful attack and their secret key was successfully 
revealed while operating in strong inversion. In order to perform the same simulations for sub-
threshold logic, we needed to characterize the available standard cell library for sub-threshold 
operation. However, due to library issues and Spectre simulation failure in ELC, the characterization 
process was aborted. Consequently, implementation of the S-Box and AES could not be completed 
for sub-threshold and there were no result to compare with strong inversion. The ELC issues were 
investigated by Cadence, who announced they would have to resolve the issues in their R&D team, 
which would require some time. Hence, despite several months of effort, research, and follow-up, this 
part of the study remains open until the near future when updates from Cadence are available.   
This research tried to improve previous research on side channel analysis of sub-threshold circuits. 
The study of NSD in this research showed that although lowering the supply voltage down to the sub-
threshold region decreases the dispersion of averaged power consumption values and as a result, 
lowers the value of NSD, however, the observed reduction was not on the order of 2500, as claimed 
in [41, 42]. The standard deviation of each region of operation was normalized with the mean value of 
the same region to provide a fair comparison. NSD of studied gates in this research demonstrated 
30%- 75% decrease while the order of magnitude remained the same. Compared to previous research 
[43], we considered a CPA attack instead of a DPA attack and also employed ASIC design 
methodologies rather than full csutom circuit design. 
6.2 Conclusions and Future Works 
All experiments in this research illustrated improved power consumption behavior from the side 
channel information leakage aspect in lowering the operating voltage from strong inversion region 
down to sub-threshold. Various used measures, such as DME, NED and NSD, represented lower 
dependency of power consumption on handled data and executed operation. Correlation power 
analysis also demonstrated that power consumption traces of a device at sub-threshold are less 
correlated to its inputs and secret key.  
Sub-threshold circuits are also expected to show a great resistivity to power analysis attacks 
because of their current and energy level. As a circuit operating at sub-threshold consumes from 10 to 
1000 times less energy and the level of its instantaneous power consumption is significantly lower 
than the same circuit operating in strong inversion, extracting information from their power 
consumption trace will be dramatically harder. Even if an attack is possible, it will require a much 
larger number of traces and more run time to accomplish the attack. On the other hand, a low level of 




the same for strong inversion and sub-threshold has a stronger effect on the information leakage at 
sub-threshold.  
In summary, this research demonstrated that sub-threshold operation has improved security against 
side channel analysis, but also it can decrease the amount of leaked information. As sub-threshold 
circuits are of recent interest for their considerably lower energy consumption, especially for RFID 
and biomedical applications where security is a concern, their vulnerability against power analysis 
attacks must be explored. This research provides a first look at this unexplored area of sub-threshold 
circuits. 
Various topics can still be studied in power analysis of sub-threshold logics. Three possible future 
topics in this area are described next. 
Although it has been mentioned that low current level at sub-threshold leads to a dramatically harder 
or even impossible attack, a measure to quantize this statement based on available measurement 
equipment could not be found. Thus obtaining such a measure, as the first possible extension to this 
research, would be beneficial for a more precise evaluation of sub-threshold circuit.  
In order to further investigate the sub-threshold logic behavior against power analysis attacks, the 
dependency of information leakage on voltage in the sub-threshold region could be studied. It is also 
interesting to examine if there is any optimum voltage to achieve the least amount of information 
leakage. 
Finally, implementing proposed side channel resistant logics for sub-threshold operation could be 
an interesting topic of study. A major drawback of the previously proposed logics is their high 
amount of energy consumption. Therefore, a sub-threshold version of those logics is expected to 


















Encounter Library Characterizer’s Issues 
 
This appendix provides more details about the issues in ELC that are reported to CMC Microsystems 
and a Cadence Change Request submitted to Cadence R&D team. 
First issue is with the 65 nm TSMC model library. This model library contains some include 
instructions that includes different section of the same file within the original file and causes re-
definition error. Commenting the include section was the first approach that we chose and succeed to 
resolve that problem; however, that is not a recommended approach and the problem has to be 
resolved by Cadence or TSMC. A related given error is as follows: 
 [ERROR(db_prepare)] spice syntax error: NMOS_RF : redefinition of 
the subckt [ file = crn65gplus_2d5_lk_v1d0.scs, #line = 3924 ] 
 => subckt nmos_rf d g s b inl=ne 
  
Next and more important error occurs during the SPICE simulation with Spectre, after db_spice 
command. The error is: 
 [WARNING(db_spice)]No spice simulation to do, please check the 
cell/process list for any error 
The db_prepare command works fine and creates the design and all vectors but db_spice cannot 
recognize the simulation. Unfortunately, ELC leaves the log folders empty in most run that makes the 
tracking impossible; however, the error is assumed to be as follows. 
There are some parameters declared in the model file but when the ELC extract the pch and nch 
models in the db_prepare command, it does not copy those parameters value into the pch and nch 
model files, so they remain undefined. This problem does not show itself until db_spice command in 
which the spectre cannot complete the simulation because of those undefined parameters. One of the 
errors is provided below and all other errors are the same. 
 ERROR (SFE-1999): 
"/home/username/ELC_Test/foo.ipdb/NCH.device/simulate/model" 4: 
model 
`nch.1': parameter `wmin': Unknown parameter name `dxwn' found in 
       expression. 
 80 
Appendix B 
MATLAB Code for Correlation Power Analysis Attack on AES 
 
% AES attack. Each plain text takes 3680ns and total is 942080ns 
  
% Workspace that provides S-Box LUT 
workspace = 'WS1.mat'; 
method = 'CPA'; 
load('-mat',workspace); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 






% reading in the file 
data = importfile1(power_input_file); 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%% Seperating power traces and creating power_traces matrix introduced in 
%%% Chapter 4 
disp('Loading data ...'); 
  
[m,n] = size(data); 
  
%%% Some error checking to make sure that the file is generated in the 
%%% format that we expect the PrimeTime PX to generate. The expected 
format is: 
%%% Time,1,power_atTime,2,power_atTime (for one point of power trace) 
error1=0;error2=0; 
for i=1:m 
    if (mod(i,5) == 2) 
        if (data(i,n) ~= 1) 
            error1 = error1 + 1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    if (mod(i,5) == 4) 
        if (data(i,n) ~= 2) 
            error2 = error2 + 1; 
        end 





    if (mod(i,5)==3) 
        p1=data(i,1); 
    elseif (mod(i,5)==0) 
        if (p1 ~= data(i,1)) 




        end 
        p1 = 0; 
    end 
end 
%%% end of error checking, error1,2,3 must be 0 
  
%%% Creating power_traces and then aligning them based on the time matrix. 
%%% power_trace is the time aligned version of power 
start_time = 0; 
end_time = 94208000; 
cycle_cnst = 368000; 
cycle = 0; 
plain=1;time=1;data_time=0; 
power_size = zeros(256,1); 
  
for i=1:m 
    if (mod(i,5) == 1) 
        data_time = data(i,1); 
    end 
    if (mod(i,5) == 3) 
        if (start_time <= data_time)                 
            if ((cycle<=data_time) && (data_time<(cycle+cycle_cnst))) 
                power(plain,time) = data(i,1); 
                time_trace(plain,time) = (data(i-2,1)) - cycle; 
                time = time + 1; 
                power_size(plain) = power_size(plain) + 1;                 
            else 
                cycle = cycle + cycle_cnst; 
                if ( end_time <= cycle) break; end 
                plain = plain + 1; 
                time = 1;                                          
            end 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
[m,n] = size(time_trace); 
time_values = 6320; 




    for j=1:n 
        if (time_trace(i,j) ~= Times) 
            Times(k) = time_trace(i,j); 
            k = k + 1; 
        end 
    end 
end 





[m,n] = size(power); 
k=1; 
power_trace = zeros(256,time_values); 
  
for i=1:m 
    k=1; 
    for j=1:time_values 
        if (time_trace(i,k) == Times(j,1)) 
            power_trace(i,j) = power(i,k); 
            k = k + 1; 
        else 
            power_trace(i,j) = 0; 
        end 
    end 
end 
  
%%% End of power_traces creation. 
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%% 
%%% Power model matrix (predicted_power) matrix generation based on 
Hamming 
%%% Weight model and Correlating it with power_trace to create Corr_trace 
%%% matrix that we know from Chapter 4. 
  
traces = power_trace; 
  
b=1; 
inputs = [0:255]; 
  
disp('Predicting intermediate values ...'); 
[m,n] = size(traces); 
  
key = [0:255];   
after_sbox = zeros(m,256); 
  
for i=1:m 





Corr_trace = zeros(256,n); 
  
% predict the power consumption 
  
disp('Predicting the instantaneous power consumption ...'); 
predicted_power = byte_Hamming_weight(after_sbox+1); 
  





disp('Generating the correlation traces ...'); 
  
for i=1:n 
    for j=1:m 
        cmatrix=corrcoef(traces(:,i),predicted_power(:,j)); 
        Corr_trace(j,i)=cmatrix(1,2); 
    end 
end 
  
%%% Finding the Key by finding the maximum correlation coefficient in 
Corr_trace 
disp('Finding the Key ...'); 
  
max = zeros(m,1); 
for i=1:m 
    for j=1:n 
        if (max(i,1) < abs(Corr_trace(i,j))) 
            max(i,1) = abs(Corr_trace(i,j)); 
        end 






    if (max_value < max(i,1)) 
        max_value = max(i,1); 
        detected_key = i-1; 




%%% Plotting the results 
x=[0:255]; 
fprintf('Detected Key = %x\n',detected_key); 
fprintf('Max Corr = %d\n',max(max_CorrCoeff)); 
fprintf('Mean of Max Corr Coef = %d\n',mean(max_CorrCoeff)); 
  
% Plot maximum correlation coefficients trace and differnece of them 
figure; 
bar(x,max_CorrCoeff);       
  




% Plot correlation trace corresponding to the correct key 
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